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SOLICITATION BY AN INTERSTATE CARRIER-
IS IT DOING BUSINESS?
1. INTRODUCTION
Today, it is a generally well-recognized principle that if a
foreign corporation is doing business within a state it is subject to
the in personam jurisdiction of that state. The law has, however,
had much difficulty in defining the term "doing business." In the
case of International Shoe v. State of Washington,' the Supreme
Court abandoned the doing business test in favor of a test of
"minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice." This
new test has done little to solve the dilemma and consequently
most states still adhere to the old "doing business" concepts.
Nowhere is the confusion greater than in the situation where
the foreign corporation is an interstate carrier and its only activity
within the state is the maintenance of a passenger and freight
solicitation office. This is a problem of considerable magnitude in
the law today as the major railroads maintain solicitation offices
in almost all of the states in the country. These solicitaton offices
generally do not sell tickets but rather solicit business and forward
the orders to the home office. The solicitation offices do not have
the authority to bind the home office. In the factual situation
which most often gives rise to this problem plaintiff A is riding on
defendant B's railroad in state Z. A is injured as a result of B's
negligence while in state Z. A is a resident of state X. B is incor-
porated in state Y and is also doing business in several other states.
However, B's only activity within state X, the plaintiff A's resi-
dence, is the maintenance of a local office which solicits freight
and passenger business. A, for various reasons, does not want to
bring suit in state Z where the cause of action arose or in state Y
where defendant B is incorporated. A can bring his suit in state
X only if B is amenable to process there. The question of whether
solicitation by an interstate carrier constitutes doing business in a
state is of the utmost magnitude to A, for the success of his lawsuit
in state X against B depends upon this question.
II. CONFLICT OF LAWS-STATE AND FEDERAL
A great deal of the confusion in this area has resulted from an
inability of courts to determine what standards should be applied.
A state may determine its own test of doing business so long as it
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
or the commerce clause.2 Likewise, if the suit is brought in a
federal court based upon a federally-created right, a federal stand-
ard of doing business is applicable.3 The difficult question is what
law should apply in a federal diversity of citizenship suit based
upon a state-created right. Some courts have chosen to ignore state
cases altogether and have applied a federal standard in a diversity
suit.4 The preferable view in a diversity suit, in light of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins,5 is that the federal courts should apply the state
standard in determining whether an interstate carrier is subject to
suit in the state where the federal court sits.6 In a great majority
of federal cases in this area a state standard of doing business
should be applied. Largely because most of the cases are diversity
actions, the majority and preferable view is that state law should
determine whether the corporation is amenable to suit in the par-
ticular federal jurisdiction. It is only in the case of a federally-
created right that a federal standard comes into play and such cases
are few. It must be noted, however, that in a diversity suit, state
law is only determinative on the issue of whether a corporation is
amenable to suit within the state. Federal law then governs the
issue as to whether the foreign corporation has been effectively
served.7
III. SOLICITATION PLUS RULE
The question of whether solicitation by an interstate carrier
is doing business remains unanswered in the law today. In 1907,
the Supreme Court of the United States held in the case of Green
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.8 that solicitation by an interstate carrier
within a jurisdiction did not constitute doing business. In this case
the court was explicitly establishing a federal rule of what con-
stituted doing business and not interpreting any constitutional
2 Ibid.
s Singleton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 20 F.R.D. 15 (D. Mich. 1956).
4 K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Central R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (E.D.
Mich. 1957); Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D.
Pa. 1951); Leakley v. Canadian Pac. Exp., 82 F. Supp. 906 (D. Alaska
1949).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 212 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1954); Kelley v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry., 170 F.2d 195 (1st Cir.
1948); Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955);
Perkins v. Louisville & N. R.R., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
7 Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1951); see
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
8 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
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limitations of the fourteenth amendment due process clause or the
commerce clause. It must also be noted that this was a diversity of
citizenship case decided prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,9 and now
arguably is not binding in federal cases founded upon diversity of
citizenship. The Green rule was nonetheless interpreted by many
states' courts as expressing a constitutional limitation upon them
and the mere solicitation rule became the law in almost all juris-
dictions. 10
From this early ruling the "solicitation plus" doctrine gradually
evolved in both state and federal jurisdictions. Under this doctrine,
if the interstate carrier carried on any activities in addition to its
solicitation activities it was held to be doing business within the
state.'- In Frene v. Louisville Cement,'2 the court held that very
little more than mere solicitation is needed to constitute doing
business. In Frene, solicitation by the defendant's agent plus the
fact that the agent sometimes checked the jobs in which the de-
fendant's product was being used to see if the product was being
applied properly was held to be doing business even though the
defendant did not require its agent to do so. Although this case
was not an interstate commerce case, it has been cited in interstate
commerce cases for the proposition that very little more than mere
solicitation is needed to fall within the solicitation plus doctrine.
This view was also followed in Waddell v. Green Textile Associ-
ates,-3 where the court looked to the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether the Southern Railway Company was doing
business in Massachusetts. In this case the passenger agent issued
"street orders," the freight agent occasionally issued exchange bills
of lading, the office was listed in the phone directory and the rail-
road maintained a bank account in Massachusetts. These activities
9 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10 Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbon, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Kelley
v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry., 170 F.2d 195 (lst Cir. 1948); Maxfield v.
Canadian Pac. Ry., 70 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1934); Fannin v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry., 204 F. Supp. 154 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Noerr Motor Freight v.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 113 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1953);
Watterson v. New York Central, 111 F. Supp. 448 (D. Minn. 1953);
Goldstein v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 93 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. N.Y. 1950);
Doyle v. Southern Pac. Ry., 87 F. Supp 974 (E.D. Mo. 1949); Zuber v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Hershel Radio
Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.2d 286 (1952); Lam-
bert v. Schell, 235 N.C. 21, 69 S.E.2d 11 (1952); Glaser v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (Super. Ct. 1963); Hayman v.
Southern Pac. Ry., 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1955).
-1 Greenwalt v. Reading Co., 209 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
12 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
'5 92 F. Supp. 738 (D. Mass. 1950).
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were held sufficient to meet the solicitation plus test. The investi-
gation of complaints by a freight solicitation office was held to be
a sufficient additional activity to satisfy the solicitation plus doc-
trine.14 Where the local solicitation office had the authority to
bind the interstate carrier, the requirements of the test were met.15
The adjustment of claims has also qualified as an additional ac-
tivity. 6 In Atlantic Coast Ry. v. Goldberg,7 the court adhered to
the solicitation plus rule but also noted that very little more than
mere solicitation is needed to constitute doing business. The court
held that the maintenance of an employment office was enough to
satisfy the rule.
IV. MERE SOLICITATION RULE
While the solicitation plus doctrine is still the rule in a ma-
jority of the states today, several jurisdictions have held that mere
solicitation constitutes doing business. The leading state court de-
cision is Lau v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.'8 In this case the
plaintiff was a resident of Wisconsin suing the defendant railroad
in Wisconsin on a cause of action which arose in Nebraska. The
defendant had a solicitation office in Milwaukee, but did not trans-
act any other business in the state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the defendant was doing business in Wisconsin even
though it did nothing more than solicit business there and even
though the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise out of the de-
fendant's activities in Wisconsin. The court said that the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit the state
court from exercising jurisdiction although the defendant's activi-
ties were in no way related to the plaintiff's cause of action. The
Wisconsin court regarded Internatonal Shoe v. State of Washington
as controlling. The court stated: ". . . due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ,'9
The Lau decision was followed in Hornstein v. Atchinson T. &
14 Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
15 Kirkland v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 104 Ga. App. 200, 121 S.E.2d 411
(1961).
16 Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Sullivan, 126 F.2d 433 (1st Cir. 1942).
17 39 A. 2d 563 (Munic. Ct. App. D. C. 1944).
Is 14 Wis. 2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961).
19 Id. at 334, 111 N.W.2d at 162.
126 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 1 (1967)
S. F. R.R.20 which was a diversity of citizenship case in the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. In the
Hornstein case the plaintiff's cause of action arose in Kansas. The
court held that it was obligated to follow the Wisconsin rule of
doing business "especially where ... it is continuous."'2 1  The
court based its holding upon the policy of the Wisconsin statute-
the right of the citizens of Wisconsin to use the courts of the state
in suing any foreign corporation actually doing business in the
state subject only to limitations imposed upon the state by the
federal constitution.
Another decision which has refused to follow the Green rule is
Scholnik v. National Airlines.22 In this case the plaintiff was
injured in a flight over Florida. The defendant was a Florida
corporation which had no flights or offices in Ohio but did have a
leasing agreement with Capitol Airlines, a Delaware corporation,
whereby Capitol flew some of the defendant's planes into Ohio.
The defendant's crews operated the planes in flight to Ohio. The
plaintiff brought suit in Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that it had jurisdiction over the defendant. In so hold-
ing the court stated: "The effect of International Shoe v. State of
Washington, supra, has been referred to by numerous district court
cases, the following of which represent the strongly prevailing
view that the earlier rulings of the Supreme Court in the Green
and McKibbin cases are no longer a correct statement of the law. '23
It is not clear from the opinion whether the court was applying a
state or federal rule. However, the result of this decision is even
more far-reaching than the Wisconsin rule. Since, in Scholnik,
jurisdiction was based upon the defendant's leasing arrangement
with Capitol Airlines, any time an interstate carrier's rolling stock
entered a foreign jurisdiction the carrier could be subjected to per-
sonal jurisdiction. In light of the vast leasing agreements of roll-
ing stock among railroads, the Scholnik rule would seem to place
an undue burden upon interstate commerce.
Scholnik relied heavily upon Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,24
which was a case decided upon the defendant's solicitation activi-
ties within the Northern District of the United States District Court
of Ohio. The court, in holding that the defendant was doing busi-
ness within the northern district of Ohio, followed the language
20 229 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Wis. 1964).
21 Id. at 1010.
22 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955).
23 Id. at 119.
24 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1946).
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and reasoning of the International Shoe case: "minimum con-
tacts" and "reasonableness to defend" were determinative of juris-
diction. The case does not say whether the court was applying a
state or federal standard. While it talks of minimal contacts with
the state of the forum, it also refers to the "federal system of gov-
ernment." As will be discussed later, International Shoe is a con-
stitutional limitation upon the states by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and thus not binding upon a federal
court unless it was applying a state standard. However, even if
the court was applying a federal standard, it could still look by
analogy at the interpretation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R.,2 5 was a federal diversity suit
which involved an interpretation of the California doing business
concept. In holding that mere solicitation did constitute doing
business the court stated: " . ..mere solicitation, without more,
constitutes doing business within a state when the solicitation is a
regular, continuous and substantial course of business." 26  The
Perkins court felt that solicitation was such an integral part of the
railroad business that to say it did not constitute doing business
would be ignoring reality.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE LAW
A. DuE PROCESS LIvITATIONS
Since the state standards are only limited by the federal con-
stitution the relevant question is to what extent does the federal
constitution limit the state. The most important limitation is the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As mentioned
previously, the leading interstate carrier solicitation case is the
Green case, which is not a due process case. Some courts have
taken Green at face value and determined that it is the law which
governs the states.27 This is not correct. State courts may choose
to adopt Green as their standard, but they are not bound by Green
because Green, as mentioned previously, did not involve a deter-
mination of any constitutional limitation imposed upon the states
but rather introduced a federal rule with respect to doing business.
Even if Green did formerly apply to the states, there is a good
argument that a new rule was established in International Shoe
v. State of Washington.28 While International Shoe did not involve
25 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
26 Id. at 951.
27 See note 4 supra.
28 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe has been distinguished in some
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an interstate carrier, it was based upon solicitation by shoe sales-
men. The Court recognized that the facts of the case might allow
a finding that the defendant corporation fell within the solicitation
plus rule. However, the Court decided to base its decision upon a
new constitutional test-"minimum contacts" and "fair play and
substantial justice." The Court also noted that while the defend-
ant's activities might properly fall within the solicitation plus rule,
regular solicitation within the state should be sufficient to consti-
tute a "minimum contact." 29 There is, then, a strong inference in
International Shoe that regular and extensive solicitation activity
would satisfy the demands of the due process test therein defined.
The International Shoe case did not explicitly overrule Green, but
the test that International Shoe prescribes is inconsistent with the
Green holding. Green offered a qualitative test-a hard and fast
line. Solicitation was not doing business-no matter how much or
how little solicitation was carried on. International Shoe suggests
an added quantitative test which is much more flexible. If an in-
surance company which sends one insurance contract into Cali-
fornia is said to have established "minimum contacts" which do not
offend "traditional notions of justice,"30 it can hardly be said that
an interstate carrier who has a regular solicitation office employing
several people has not established minimum contacts within the
state.31
If the constitutional limitations of International Shoe are to be
applied to this area it must be remembered that the state may ex-
tend its jurisdiction to these limits but it does not necessarily have
to go as far as International Shoe allows.3 2  It is up to each in-
dividual state to decide how far it wishes to extend its jurisdiction.
B. INTERSTATE COMMa:ERCE LIIxTATIONS
The second limitation imposed upon the states' in personam
jurisdictions upon the basis that the state was suing the defendant for
taxes due. Murray v. Great Northern Ry., 67 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa.
1946). The state nonetheless had to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over the corporation before the state could enforce its tax. Thus the
fact that International Shoe involved a state tax does not seem to be
a valid distinction.
29 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
30 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
81 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Ortiz, 50 Tenn. App. 317, 361 S.W.2d 113
(1962). But Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), seems to suggest
that while the quantity of contacts is no longer determinative, the
quality of the contacts is.
82 Doyle v. Southern Pac. Ry., 87 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Mo. 1949).
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jurisdiction by the federal constitution is the commerce clause.3 3
The issue was first presented in Davis v. Farmer's Co-op Equity
Co.3 4 In that case, a Kansas plaintiff sued a Kansas railroad in
Minnesota. The railroad maintained a solicitation office in Minne-
sota and a Minnesota statute authorized service upon the agent.
The court held that the statute violated the commerce clause of
the constitution but noted that the result might have been differ-
ent had the cause of action arisen out of the defendant's activities
in Minnesota or had the plaintiff been a resident of Minnesota.
As a result of the language in Davis, some courts have placed a
high degree of significance upon the residence of the plaintiff.
In Western Smelting Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,. 5 the court held
that while the residence of the plaintiff was not controlling, it
was of high significance in determining whether there was an undue
burden upon interstate commerce. In this case the plaintiff was a
resident of the State of Nebraska and there was no undue burden
upon interstate commerce. In at least one jurisdiction,3 6 it has
been held that if a defendant is doing business within a district so
as to be amenable to process and if the plaintiff is a resident of
that district, there is no undue burden upon interstate commerce as
a matter of law. However, in Zuber v. Pennsylvania R.R.,87 the
fact that the plaintiff was a resident of the state in which he
brought suit was only one of the factors considered and it was held
that there was an undue burden upon interstate commerce.
This limitation of the Constitution is not as important today as
it once was, because the vast expansion of interstate commerce has
made subjection to interstate jurisdiction far harder to characterize
as burdensome. The latest test of the Supreme Court is not wheth-
er there is a burden on interstate commerce but whether the bur-
den is oppressive. 3  The test prescribed is a Very hard one to apply
because of the difficulty in differentiating between a burden and
an oppressive burden. Because of the inherent difficulties in the
application of such a test and the vast nature of interstate com-
merce, most courts have chosen to avoid the pitfalls of a com-
merce clause test by not using the commerce clause as a measuring
stick with respect to state limitations upon doing business.
33 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
34 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
35 81 F. Supp. 494 (D. Neb. 1948).
36 Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
37 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
38 International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 511 (1933).
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VI. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Probably the more important limitation upon the state in this
area is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Under this doctrine,
a court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction over a transitory cause
of action, even though the defendant is amenable to process, if it
appears that the case could be more justly tried in another juris-
diction. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,39 specified several factors to be taken
into consideration in determining whether or not a court should
invoke the doctrine. These are: (1) the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process
for the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the cost of ob-
taining willing witnesses; (4) the possibility of view of the prem-
ises, if view would be appropriate to the action; (5) all practical
problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inex-
pensive; (6) the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained;
(7) the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; (8) ad-
ministrative difficulties; (9) the imposition of burden of jury duty
on the community; (10) the local interest of having local matters
decided at home; (11) the appropriateness of having the trial of a
diversity case in a forum which is familiar with the state law
that must govern. All these factors are to be weighed together.
By utilizing the doctrine of forum non conveniens, problems of
commerce clause interpretation can be avoided by looking at the
entire situation and deciding whether it would be fair to subject a
defendant to a particular jurisdiction.
A similar type of doctrine has developed in the federal court
system. This is known as the doctrine of transferability. 40 Under
this doctrine a federal court has a much broader discretion than
has a state court in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
If a state court decides to invoke the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, a dismissal of the proceeding results. This is not true
of a transfer under federal law and consequently a lesser showing
of inconvenience is needed in the federal courts.
VII. CAUSE OF ACTION LIMITATIONS
Some states have chosen to limit their jurisdiction by requir-
ing that a defendant doing business in a state can only be sued in
39 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
40 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1962), which provides: "For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought."
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that state if the plaintiff's cause of action arose from the defend-
ant's activities within the state.41 This is often accomplished by
the passage of long arm statutes, among the most notable of which
is the Illinois statute.42 However, it has been a traditional notion
in jurisdiction that a plaintiff may sue a defendant on a transitory
cause of action any place from which the defendant can be effec-
tively served with process. Consequently, a great number of
states have not required that the cause of action arise from the
defendant's activities within the state.4
3
The question of whether the plaintiff's cause of action should
arise from the defendant's activity within the state is closely re-
lated to the interstate commerce limitation discussed previously.
As a result of this close connection many courts have held that the
plaintiff must be a resident of the state or district where he insti-
tutes his action.4 4 In at least one federal district court case even
the non-residence of the plaintiff was held to be of no conse-
quence.45 It must be noted that the defendant could have asked to
have the case transferred under the transferability rule.
If a state does require that the plaintiff's cause of action arise
out of the defendant's activities within the state, it makes almost
certain the meeting of requirements under any doing business
standard. In the case of an interstate carrier, particularly with
respect to personal injury claims, the plaintiff can almost always
sue the defendant where the cause of action accrued. Today, as
more people are travelling great distances many courts have recog-
nized the need to give the plaintiff an adequate remedy for any
injury he receives. Suppose a man who is a resident of Nebraska is
injured while on a train in Ohio, resulting in a claim for 500 dollars.
It is doubtful that he would be very anxious to travel to Ohio to
41 Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Goldstein v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 93 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. N.Y. 1950); Zuber v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1949); White v. South-
ern Pac. Ry., 386 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1962).
42 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1961).
48 Scholnik v. National Airlines, 219 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1955); Lone Star
Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954);
Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1946); Hornstein v.
Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 229 F. Supp. 1009 (W.D. Wis. 1964); Perkins
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Western
Smelting Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 81 F. Supp. 494 (D. Neb. 1948);
,Berry v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 N.J. Super. 321, 193 A.2d 569 (Super.
Ct. 1963); Lau v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R., 14 Wis. 2d 329, 111
N.W.2d 158 (1961).
44 See note 43 supra.
45 Wadell v. Green Textile Associates, 92 F. Supp. 738 (D. Mass. 1950).
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sue the railroad. On the other hand, unless several witnesses have
to be brought to Nebraska, it would probably be much less burden-
some for the railroad to defend in Nebraska. It is submitted that a
problem such as this involves a factual determination and could
more properly be handled under a doctrine of forum non conveniens
or transferability. In this manner each individual court could
examine the particular equities of the parties in order to decide
where the lawsuit should be entertained.
VIII. NEBRASKA LAW
As discussed previously, a state may set up any standard for
doing business so long as it meets federal constitutional require-
ments. Nebraska has long recognized a doing business concept of
corporate jurisdiction. The applicable statute is NE. REV. STAT.
§ 21-20,114 (Supp. 1965), which provided that if a corporation does
not appoint a registered agent within the state in compliance with
§ 21-20,112, then the Secretary of State shall be deemed the regis-
tered agent of the corporation and the corporation can be served
by leaving a copy of the summons with the Secretary of State.
In Wilken v. Moorman Mfg. Co.,46 the court held that a foreign
corporation which is actually doing business in Nebraska may
have a valid service of process made against it upon the Secre-
tary of State, even though it has not expressly consented to such
jurisdiction.
Since Nebraska, in determining its jurisdiction, is subject to
the constitutional limitations imposed upon the states by Interna-
tional Shoe, the question is whether Nebraska has gone as far as
International Shoe allows or has stopped somewhere short of In-
ternational Shoe. The Nebraska Supreme Court has never decided
a doing business case involving solicitation by an interstate carrier.
However, in a case involving a sale of a copying machine by a for-
eign corporation to a Nebraska plaintiff, the court took judicial no-
tice of the International Shoe doctrine as establishing a due process
limitation, but held that the corporation was not doing business.
47
The corporation's only activity was filling a mail order which was
sent by the Nebraska plaintiff.
The Nebraska court held in Brown v. Globe Laboratories48
that the solicitation of orders by a foreign corporation and the
holding of dealer schools by the foreign corporation was sufficient
46 121 Neb. 1, 235 N.W. 671 (1931).
47 Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Copymotion, Inc., 178 Neb. 239, 132 N.W.2d 788
(1965).
48 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151 (1957).
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to authorize service upon it. From the Brown case, it can be ar-
gued that solicitation is doing business in Nebraska and Nebraska
is extending its jurisdiction as far as International Shoe allows.
Whether this rule would be applied to an interstate carrier is an
open question. If International Shoe has supplanted the Green
case, then there is no reason why the same test with respect to
solicitation as doing business should not apply to interstate carriers
as well as other types of business.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is a basic need in this area for some degree of certainty
and uniformity. From the standpoint of an interstate carrier it
would be desirable to know to what extent a state can subject the
carrier to the state's jurisdiction so the carrier can judge its con-
duct accordingly. Interstate carriers have placed much reliance
upon Green, but there is now serious doubt as to whether this case
is good law even in jurisdictions which have previously cited it as
a correct statement of the law.49
The policies in this area are rather evenly divided. It seems
quite unfair to subject an interstate carrier to the jurisdiction
of a far-off state when the carrier does very little, if anything,
within the state. This is why a hard and fast rule like the one
established in Green is not the solution to the problem. To say
that solicitation is doing business or that solicitation is not doing
business is quite an arbitrary dividing line. Solicitation activities
can vary from a one-man office which is responsible for the solici-
tation of a few passenger tickets per year to a twenty-man office
which solicits thousands of dollars worth of freight business per
year.
The plaintiff also has some very valid interests in being able to
choose his forum. Today, as more potential plaintiffs are travelling
across the country, it has become desirable to provide them with a
forum where they can litigate their claims at the least expense
and effort, without violating "fair play" and "substantial justice"
by requiring the defendant to defend in a remote jurisdiction where
jury verdicts are known to be high. Thus, it would be desirable, if
not absolutely necessary in order to meet the fairness test of Inter-
national Shoe, to limit the plaintiff's choice of forum to either
where the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff maintains
his residence, providing that the defendant maintains "minimum
contacts" with the forum that the plaintiff chooses.
49 International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914).
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As stated prevously, the rule established in Green is extremely
arbitrary in view of the vast solicitation activities in which inter-
state carriers are now engaged. The best solution to the problem is
to make it clear that the International Shoe test of "minimum con-
tacts" and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" is controlling in the area of interstate carriers as well as in
other areas of doing business. This would take a decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States. A decision of this nature
explicitly adopting the International Shoe test would allow the
states to extend the doctrine of doing business as far as they wish
in interstate carrier cases so long as the International Shoe test is
not violated. The rule of International Shoe is flexible enough to
allow a state court to look at any given case and determine the
best jurisdiction where the suit should be filed. In this manner,
the equities of both parties could be examined and much fairer de-
cisions would result. This rule would also allow a court to deter-
mine whether a particular defendant's contact with the forum is
sufficient to allow the court to take jurisdiction. Some of the
solicitation activities of the major interstate carriers are very ex-
tensive and indeed an integral part of the business process. In
these situations where the carrier is receiving large amounts of
business from a jurisdiction it seems unrealistic and unjust to say
that the carrier is not doing business in the jurisdiction.
William D. Sutter, Jr., '67
